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<title>Matthew Kuch</title>
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  <title>Thank You for Showing Us the Way, Uncle Jeff</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/thank-you-uncle-jeff/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




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<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/thank-you-uncle-jeff/images/uncle-jeff.jpg" class="img-fluid figure-img" alt="Black and white portrait of Geoffrey Onegi-Obel in glasses and a dark jacket, standing among trees."></p>
<figcaption>Geoffrey Alan Onegi-Obel, 20 October 1955 to 18 October 2026</figcaption>
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</div>
<p>My Uncle Jeff, Geoffrey Onegi-Obel, the head of our family, passed away on 18th October 2026, two days short of his 71st birthday. Even now it is still a real shock, and a blow to so many of us who knew him, admired him and were mentored and shaped by him over the years.</p>
<p>I just wanted to take some time to reflect on what he meant to me. As I think back, he seems to appear at different points in my life, looking after me when I was a boy, showing me by his example how to carry myself, and encouraging me later on when I felt like giving up.</p>
<p>The earliest of those points goes back to when I was still a boy, somewhere around the age of 10 to 13. Life had hit my mother hard financially, and she had to look for work and opportunities outside Kampala. She found them in Namasagali, lecturing at the new university there, which meant that she would have to move. It was Uncle Jeff, my Auntie Laker and my cousins who welcomed me into their home, so that her move would not disrupt my education in Kampala. I was too young then to understand how much that was to ask of a family. To them it may have seemed a small thing, one more child at the table. I have come to think that it shaped my worldview, and eventually the path of my life, forever.</p>
<p>It gave me more playtime with Angello (aka Bongo), for a start. We were nearly the same age, and we spent so much time together during those formative years that being cousins slowly became a lifelong friendship and brotherhood. I don’t think it would have happened in quite the same way if we had only met at family gatherings.</p>
<p>It also put me within reach of Uncle Jeff’s books. He loved sci-fi and he loved reading, and that love passed on to us quite naturally, the way these things do when the books are simply there in the house. One of my favourite books came from his library, “As the Crow Flies” by Jeffrey Archer. It made me believe I could change my fortunes, and for a boy whose mother had to leave town to find work, that was no small thing to believe.</p>
<p>Then there was the desktop PC he bought Bongo, which sat in Bongo’s room and opened up the world of software, video games and technology for us. At the time I suppose we thought we were just playing. Much later I would find myself drawn to science, philosophy and computer programming, and when I trace that lifelong interest back, a lot of it leads to that room.</p>
<p>So he had created a home where we could dream big and imagine alternate realities, and I think that alone would have been plenty. But I also remember how he came home. He was a giant in his field of finance and capital markets, the founding chairman of the Uganda Securities Exchange, though I doubt I understood much of that as a boy. To me he was the man who got back in the evenings always smiling, warm and happy to see us. I can only imagine now what stresses and issues he must have carried from work on some of those days. He never brought that energy home. He greeted us with a cool handshake, a fluid slide of palms that locked into a firm finger grip, pulling back just right to release a sharp, satisfying thumb snap. It was a small, practised ritual that made us feel special and cool too. And without saying much, he went about showing us what a good father should be.</p>
<p>I think about that a lot now that I have kids of my own. I can’t help but model what I saw in him as I raise my own little people. I may not always manage it, but I know what it is supposed to look like, because I saw it every evening and every moment he was around. For a young boy growing up with a single mum, seeing that up close meant the world to me. Thank you for showing us the way, Uncle Jeff.</p>
<p>You didn’t stop once I moved back in with my mum. All through secondary school, then university and beyond, you kept checking in on how we were doing, and you kept encouraging me to continue dreaming big and to try a little harder to accomplish those dreams. I have thought about that idea since you passed, because a little harder always seemed possible, even on the days when dreaming big did not.</p>
<p>There is something I never told you, though I think you figured it out. The reason I applied to St Mary’s College Kisubi (SMACK) during my Form 4 was you and Bongo. I wanted to go to the same school that the people I admired went to, and it was as simple as that. And yes, I got in. Not only that, I did so well that I was among the best in the country and got a scholarship to attend the United World College in Hong Kong, a chapter that would change the rest of my life. People might look at that and see a boy who worked hard, and I did. But when I look back, it all started with wanting to be like you.</p>
<p>Since your passing, I have been reading and listening to what others have to say about you, and it has become clear to me that you touched and shaped the lives of far more people than I ever knew. <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/dr-geoffrey-alan-onegi-obel-life-building-markets-kenneth-legesi-cfa-uawxe/">Kenneth Legesi</a> wrote that when he met you in 2008, a civil engineer trying to move into finance, you took him under your wing, treating him “less as a young professional seeking guidance and more as a son”. I recognised you straight away, because I know what it is to be welcomed by you like that. I used to think of what you did for me as something within our family. I see now that you were doing it for a lot of people. You were a good man, a role model and a father figure to so many of us.</p>
<p>Thank you for showing us the way, Uncle Jeff.</p>



 ]]></description>
  <category>Personal Reflections</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/thank-you-uncle-jeff/</guid>
  <pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<item>
  <title>The Shilling Has Been Here Before</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/uganda-shilling-2026/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>For most of this year, the price of a dollar was background noise. Then, somewhere in September, it became the conversation.</p>
<p>On 5 October the shilling closed above 4,000 to the dollar for the first time. On 13 October, Bank of Uganda opened the day at 4,153, the weakest the shilling has been since records began. The next morning the central bank held a special meeting, a month ahead of schedule, and raised its main interest rate from 9.75% to 12%, its biggest increase since 2011. The shilling bounced that afternoon. By Friday it had given most of it back, closing at 4,138.</p>
<p>The headlines reached for the words you would expect: record low, free fall.</p>
<p>I don’t trade currencies. But I do work in health financing, where a lot of what we pay for is priced in dollars, so I have been watching this more closely than usual. And when something unsettles me, my habit is to go and look at the data until I understand it a little better.</p>
<p>There is a line from the writer Kelly Hayes that Morgan Housel likes to quote: <em>“Everything feels unprecedented when you haven’t engaged with history.”</em></p>
<p>So this is me engaging with a little history. I am writing it down now, while it is happening, partly so that a future version of me can look back and remember how it felt.</p>
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/uganda-shilling-2026/images/01-long-view.png" class="img-fluid" alt="Line chart of Uganda shillings per US dollar, 1993 to 16 October 2026. The rate rises from about 1,200 to 4,138 in steps. Four sharp falls are shaded: 2008-09 (+46%), 2011 (+28%), 2015 (+41%) and 2026 (+20% since 21 January)."></p>
<section id="what-is-going-on" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="what-is-going-on">What is going on</h2>
<p>Bank of Uganda’s own explanation, in the statement it released after that meeting, is that several things went wrong at once. The news reports fill in the rest.</p>
<p>The first is oil. The war in the Middle East has disrupted shipping and pushed up the price of fuel, freight and insurance. Brent crude went from about $71 a barrel at the start of July to about $107 by mid-September, according to the government. Uganda imports all of its fuel, so we need more dollars for every litre. The Energy Minister estimated that the shilling’s slide in September and early October alone added about Shs300 to a litre of fuel.</p>
<p>The second is that we are earning less. Coffee export earnings in July were 18% lower than a year earlier. Tourism took a knock from travel restrictions, and visitors stayed away after the Ebola outbreak earlier this year. Bank of Uganda says the current account deficit, the gap between the dollars we spend abroad and the dollars we earn, widened by $1.4 billion to $4.6 billion.</p>
<p>The third is money leaving. Over the past two years, foreign investors bought a lot of Ugandan government bonds, attracted by high interest rates. By June this year they held about $2.7 billion of our government’s debt. Now that interest rates abroad look more attractive and investors everywhere are nervous, some of that money is heading for the door. Citigroup estimated that over $200 million left in just two weeks.</p>
<p>Add importers, energy firms and telecoms buying dollars early ahead of the year-end rush, and you have more people wanting dollars than there are dollars on offer.</p>
<p>Then there is the question of what to do about it. Central banks can sell dollars from their reserves to slow a fall. On 9 October, President Museveni said publicly that Bank of Uganda had proposed doing exactly that, and that he had refused. He described the fall as a global problem driven by the wars in the Middle East, said a weaker shilling is good for exporters, who earn more shillings for every dollar, and argued that reserves should not be spent propping up imports. He urged Ugandans to import less. The reserves stood at about $6.5 billion in August, a little over three and a half months of imports. Bank of Uganda’s officials have said the shilling is market-determined, and the bank has leaned on other tools instead: raising the share of deposits that banks must keep with it to 13.5% in September, and then the interest rate rise this week.</p>
</section>
<section id="is-it-us-or-is-it-the-dollar" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="is-it-us-or-is-it-the-dollar">Is it us, or is it the dollar?</h2>
<p>The first thing I wanted to know was whether this is a Uganda story or a dollar story. When the dollar gets stronger, almost every currency weakens against it, and you would expect the shilling to fall alongside our neighbours.</p>
<p>That is not what happened.</p>
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/uganda-shilling-2026/images/03-neighbours.png" class="img-fluid" alt="Bar chart of the change in each currency against the US dollar from 31 July to 16 October 2026. Uganda +10.3%, Zambia +3.7%, Kenya +0.4%, South Africa 0.0%, Tanzania -0.3%, Nigeria -2.4%. The US dollar index rose 2%."></p>
<p>Since the end of July, the dollar has risen about 2% against the major world currencies. Over the same period, a dollar got 10% more expensive in Kampala. In Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the price barely moved. Bloomberg reported that since late August, the shilling has fallen further than any of the 144 currencies it tracks.</p>
<p>So the global forces are real, but they have landed harder here than next door. My reading is that this points to the things specific to Uganda: the foreign money that had piled into our bond market, and an import bill that grew faster than our exports.</p>
</section>
<section id="have-we-been-here-before" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="have-we-been-here-before">Have we been here before?</h2>
<p>On the long chart at the top, a dollar cost about 1,200 shillings in 1993, when the shilling started trading freely on a new interbank market. It costs about 4,100 today. Over 33 years, the price has climbed in a series of steps, and every step up set a new record.</p>
<p>I counted. Between 2005, when Bank of Uganda’s daily data begins, and this September, the shilling hit a new all-time low on 153 separate days, spread across eight different years. October has added a few more. “Record low” is a headline we have read many times before. It is almost guaranteed to come back, because prices in Uganda have risen faster than prices in America for as long as anyone can remember, and the exchange rate slowly follows.</p>
<p>Go back a little further and the 1980s make today look calm. In May 1987, the government introduced the new shilling, knocked two zeros off the old one, took a 30% tax on the cash people converted, and devalued: overnight, a dollar went from 14 new shillings to 60. Inflation at the time was well over 200% a year. Between 1986 and 1993, the price of a dollar went up more than 80 times. People lived through that, and many of them are still around to tell you about it.</p>
<p>So the level isn’t the useful question. The useful question is how fast it is falling, because speed is what hurts. A slow, steady slide gives businesses and households time to adjust. A sudden drop doesn’t.</p>
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/uganda-shilling-2026/images/02-episodes.png" class="img-fluid" alt="Bar chart ranking every fall of the shilling since 2005 in which the dollar became at least 8% dearer than its 12-month low: 2008-09 +46%, 2014-15 +41%, 2010-11 +28%, 2026 so far +20%, 2012-13 +18%, 2007 +14%, 2022 +11%, 2016-17 +10%, 2023-24 +9%, 2018 +8%."></p>
<p>By that measure, 2026 is bad but not the worst. From its strongest point this year, on 21 January just after the elections, the shilling has lost about a sixth of its value: a dollar costs 20% more. In 2008–09, during the global financial crisis, a dollar got 46% more expensive within a year. In 2015, it was 41%. In 2011, it was 28%, inflation hit 30% and Bank of Uganda pushed its interest rate to 23%.</p>
<p>Some of these stories rhyme with today in ways I didn’t expect.</p>
<p>In July 2015, after spending more than $200 million defending the shilling, Governor Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile said: <em>“It is not sustainable for the Bank of Uganda to try and prop up the exchange rate.”</em> Different decade, different people, same argument about reserves.</p>
<p>The 2015 storm was regional, though. The Tanzanian shilling fell about as much as ours that year, and the Kenyan shilling fell too. This time, we are mostly on our own.</p>
<p>And each of the big episodes eventually turned. By the end of 2009, the shilling had won back about half of what it lost in the financial crisis. Most of the 2011 fall was reversed by early 2012, once the high interest rates bit. The long chart also shows that the shilling rarely went all the way back to where it started. Each storm left it a step higher than before.</p>
</section>
<section id="the-real-terms-view" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="the-real-terms-view">The real-terms view</h2>
<p>There is one more way to look at this, and it surprised me.</p>
<p>Because prices in Uganda rise faster than in the countries we trade with, the shilling has to lose some value every year just to stand still. Economists adjust for this using something called the real effective exchange rate, which accounts for inflation and for all our trading partners, not just America. Bank of Uganda publishes it every month.</p>
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/uganda-shilling-2026/images/04-real-terms.png" class="img-fluid" alt="Line chart of Bank of Uganda's real effective exchange rate index, 2005 to August 2026, where higher means a weaker shilling. Peaks of 105 in 2011, 105 in 2015 and 108 in 2018. August 2026 is 91, and a rough estimate for 16 October is about 101."></p>
<p>On this measure, the shilling in August 2026 was at 91. At the worst moments of 2011 and 2015, it was at 105. In 2018 it reached 108. The figures for September and October aren’t out yet, and the shilling has fallen a long way since August. If I scale August’s figure by how much the dollar rate has moved since, I get roughly 101 at today’s rate. That is only a rough estimate, but it says we are close to those old lows, within about 5%, without having passed them.</p>
<p>This doesn’t make 4,138 painless. The bills people pay are in nominal shillings, not in index points. But it does mean that, adjusted for inflation, this is not yet the weakest the shilling has been. It is getting close.</p>
</section>
<section id="what-it-means" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="what-it-means">What it means</h2>
<p>For households, the most visible effect is fuel. Petrol prices in September were 31% higher than a year earlier, and diesel 42.5% higher. Bank of Uganda now expects inflation to average 7 to 7.5% over the next year, up from 4.6% in September, and growth to slow.</p>
<p>In my own world of health financing, the arithmetic is uncomfortable. Many medicines, test kits and other health commodities are bought in dollars. A health budget set in shillings for this financial year, which began on 1 July when a dollar cost about 3,666, buys roughly 11% less at 4,138. Nobody announces that cut. It just happens, quietly, at the point of purchase.</p>
</section>
<section id="what-history-does-and-doesnt-tell-us" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="what-history-does-and-doesnt-tell-us">What history does and doesn’t tell us</h2>
<p>So, is this moment unprecedented?</p>
<p>Measured in shillings per dollar, yes, technically. But we set that kind of record on 153 days between 2005 and this September.</p>
<p>Measured by speed, no. Three falls in the last twenty years were sharper.</p>
<p>Measured in real terms, not yet. The shilling was weaker in 2011, 2015 and 2018, though the gap has narrowed.</p>
<p>What does feel new is the mix: an oil shock from a war far away, arriving just as foreign money had become a much bigger part of our bond market, plus a public decision not to spend reserves defending the currency. I don’t know how this one ends. Nobody does. The shilling could recover some ground as the rate rise takes effect, or it could keep sliding if oil stays high and the money keeps leaving.</p>
<p>History can’t tell you what happens next. What it can tell you is what kinds of things tend to happen, and that people have been through worse and adjusted. The shilling has been here before. So have we.</p>
<p>I’ll come back to this post in a year and see how it reads.</p>
</section>
<section id="notes-and-sources" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="notes-and-sources">Notes and Sources</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Exchange rates:</strong> Bank of Uganda official mid rates, from its <em>Exchange Rates</em> workbook (monthly averages from 1981, daily rates from September 2005 to 30 September 2026). The 16 October figure (4,138.10, closing mid rate) is from Bank of Uganda’s <a href="https://bou.or.ug/uploads/Daily_Exchange_Rate_Cards_Website_461b91c4e4.xlsx">daily rate card</a>. The 2, 5, 13 and 14 October figures are Bank of Uganda rates as reported by <a href="https://ugbusiness.com/2026/10/economy/what-the-bank-of-ugandas-rise-to-12-per-cent-means-for-the-shilling-fuel-and-loans">UG Business</a>, <a href="https://www.pulse.ug/story/uganda-shilling-falls-33-year-low-2026101307231326760">Pulse Uganda</a> and <a href="https://www.businessday.co.za/world/africa/2026-10-14-uganda-lifts-interest-rate-to-12-at-emergency-meeting/">BusinessDay/Reuters</a>. Daily data for 1 to 15 October was not yet published, so the chart joins 30 September to 16 October with a dashed line. I cross-checked the series against the BIS and the World Bank (from IMF data); they closely match.</li>
<li><strong>How the falls are measured:</strong> for every day since September 2005, the rate that day compared with the lowest rate in the previous 12 months. An episode is a run of days when the dollar was at least 5% above that low (runs measured from the same low, or less than 30 days apart, are merged), and its size is the biggest value in the run. The chart shows every episode that reached 8% or more. The same rule is used for every episode, including 2026. Measured from 31 December 2025 instead of the January low, a dollar costs 14% more this year.</li>
<li><strong>Record lows:</strong> a day on which the shilling was weaker than on any earlier day in the daily series and than any earlier monthly average back to 1981. There were 153 such days between September 2005 and 30 September 2026, in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2018, 2020 and 2024. The previous record was 3,945 on 26 February 2024. October 2026 broke it in its first days: Bank of Uganda’s rate closed at 3,966.90 on 2 October (<a href="https://www.pulse.ug/story/uganda-shilling-falls-33-year-low-2026101307231326760">Pulse Uganda</a>).</li>
<li><strong>Other currencies:</strong> Yahoo Finance daily closes, 31 July to 16 October 2026. Rwanda and Ghana are left out because their daily data jumped between two values from one day to the next. These agree with Bank of Uganda’s own cross rates for Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa on 16 October, and with the <a href="https://thekenyatimes.com/business/cbk-reveals-new-dollar-exchange-rate-as-kenya-shilling-holds-steady/">Central Bank of Kenya</a> rate. The “worst of 144 currencies” figure is from <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-12/-usd-ugx-uganda-shilling-turns-worst-currency-as-investors-sour-on-local-debt">Bloomberg</a>, measured from 25 August (also reported via <a href="https://www.briefs.co/news/bank-of-uganda-calls-special-rate-meeting-as-shilling-hits-r/">Briefs</a>).</li>
<li><strong>Real effective exchange rate:</strong> Bank of Uganda, Monthly Bureau Rates sheet, CPI base 2017 = 100. A higher number means a weaker shilling. My estimate for 16 October is the August index multiplied by the 16 October rate divided by the August average rate (3,730). It assumes prices and our trading partners’ currencies barely moved since August, which is roughly true for Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa. It is a rough guide, not an official figure.</li>
<li><strong>Causes, interest rate and inflation forecast:</strong> <a href="https://bou.or.ug/uploads/MPS_October_2026_cdc1de720f.pdf">Bank of Uganda Monetary Policy Statement, 14 October 2026</a> (Middle East, freight and insurance, current account, coffee and cocoa, tourism, the rate rise, inflation and growth). Ebola and tourism: <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/experts-link-uganda-shilling-fall-to-ebola-reduced-donor-funds-5628520">Daily Monitor</a>. Oil prices (a cabinet minister’s figures) and the Energy Minister’s Shs300 per litre estimate: <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/govt-attributes-fuel-prices-to-global-costs-taxes-shilling-depreciation/">The Independent</a>. Coffee earnings: <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/uganda-s-export-revenues-surge-to-1-4b-as-gold-gains-offset-coffee-slump-5603352">Daily Monitor</a>. Foreign holdings of government debt: <a href="https://uchumi360.com/r/u/uganda-shilling-sinks-past">Uchumi360</a>. Year-end dollar demand: <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2026/kenyan-and-ugandan-currencies-under-strain">CNBC Africa/Reuters</a>. “Market-determined”: Bank of Uganda officials in the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/don-t-panic-over-the-shilling-bou-5622842">Daily Monitor</a>. Reserves: <a href="https://ugbusiness.com/2026/10/economy/museveni-rejects-selling-dollar-reserves-to-prop-up-the-shilling">UG Business</a>. Citigroup’s outflow estimate: Bloomberg (above). Cash reserve requirement: <a href="https://pmldaily.com/business/2026/09/bank-of-uganda-raises-cash-reserve-requirement-for-commercial-banks-to-13-5.html">PML Daily</a>. Fuel price inflation for September: UG Business (first link above).</li>
<li><strong>The President’s remarks on reserves (9 October):</strong> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-rejects-bou-proposal-to-deploy-foreign-reserves-to-save-shilling-5625570">Daily Monitor</a> and <a href="https://nilepost.co.ug/news/376778/museveni-blames-gulf-conflict-for-shillings-depreciation-rising-fuel-prices">Nile Post</a>.</li>
<li><strong>History:</strong> 1987 currency reform: <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/169341468110057350/pdf/multi-page.pdf">World Bank (1987)</a> and <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781557754615/ch02.xml">IMF</a>. 2008–09: <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08af640f0b652dd0009ea/5823_Uganda_Phase2.pdf">ODI (2010)</a>. 2011: <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12135.pdf">IMF Country Report 12/135</a>. 2015: <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16145.pdf">IMF Country Report 16/145</a>, and Mutebile’s remarks in the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/defending-the-shilling-is-unsustainable-mutebile-1617234">Daily Monitor</a>. Regional currencies in 2015: <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/business/prosper/high-inflation-weak-shilling-what-s-happening--1615444">Daily Monitor</a>.</li>
<li><strong>The quote:</strong> Kelly Hayes, <a href="https://twitter.com/MsKellyMHayes/status/1282093046943952902">on Twitter, July 2020</a>, as quoted by Morgan Housel in <a href="https://collabfund.com/blog/engaging-with-history/"><em>Engaging With History</em></a>.</li>
<li>Charts and analysis are my own. Written on 17 October 2026; the numbers will move.</li>
</ul>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Political Economy</category>
  <category>Health Financing</category>
  <category>Data Visualization</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/uganda-shilling-2026/</guid>
  <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/uganda-shilling-2026/images/01-long-view.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="99" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Uganda Nearly Halved Its Malaria Rate. So Why Are Just as Many of Us Getting Sick?</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/malaria-in-uganda/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>Like many Ugandans, I have been getting malaria, and recovering from it, for most of my life. For a lot of us, it just keeps coming back.</p>
<p>In August I was down with it once again. About six weeks before that, it was my three-year-old daughter. That is when it gets really tough, because this time it is your child who is sick. Luckily, we both recovered.</p>
<p>In July, a 14-year-old student at Gayaza High School, a short drive from my home, did not. She died of severe malaria. It is gut-wrenching to think about what her parents are still going through. Losing a child like that is something you never fully recover from.</p>
<p>Her death made me curious. How big a problem is malaria still in Uganda, and have we actually made progress over the years?</p>
<p>So I went looking for the data, and I found 26 years of it, for every district in Uganda, thanks to the Malaria Atlas Project.</p>
<p>Here is what I found. Uganda has nearly halved its malaria rate, from 502 cases for every 1,000 people in 2000 to 258 in 2025. That is a real achievement. But over the same period, our population doubled, from 23.5 million to 46.6 million. So about as many Ugandans got malaria in 2025 (12.0 million) as in 2000 (11.8 million).</p>
<p>In other words, the rate fell, but the number of people getting sick has barely moved in 25 years.</p>
<p>I triangulated the Malaria Atlas data with other sources, and they show the same trend. The World Health Organization’s estimates tell a similar story: the rate fell from 483 to 264 cases for every 1,000 people between 2000 and 2024, while the number of cases rose from 11.6 million to 13.2 million. And Uganda’s latest Malaria Indicator Survey (2024–25) found malaria in 13% of children under five, up from 10% in 2018–19.</p>
<p>District by district, the picture is not pretty. Since 2015, 69 of our 135 districts have lost ground, and Wakiso, where I live, is one of them. Meanwhile, the money holding the line is mostly not ours: in 2022–24, about 98% of the tracked funding for malaria control came from donors.</p>
<p>To make the data easier to see, I built an interactive data story with the help of Claude Code. You can click through it at your own pace, drag the map through the years, and look up your own district.</p>
<p><a href="../../lab/malaria-in-uganda/" class="btn btn-primary mt-2 mb-3">Open the interactive story →</a></p>
<p>It takes about five minutes. If you look up your district, I would love to hear what you find.</p>



 ]]></description>
  <category>Global Health</category>
  <category>Health Financing</category>
  <category>Data Visualization</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/malaria-in-uganda/</guid>
  <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/malaria-in-uganda/images/cover.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Africa’s Causes of Death, 2021</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-causes-of-death/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>My latest explorable data story breaks down the causes of death in Africa, drawn from the World Health Organization’s Global Health Estimates 2021.</p>
<p>As DRC and Uganda work to contain the latest Ebola outbreak, it’s worth remembering the quieter killers too. The communicable and non-communicable diseases that take far more lives across the continent every year, with none of the headlines.</p>
<p>Have a look, and poke at the numbers yourself. There are two versions.</p>
<p><strong>1. The data story.</strong> A scrolling read on what 8.3 million deaths in 2021 looked like, age band by age band.</p>
<p><a href="../../lab/africa-causes-of-death/" class="btn btn-primary mt-2 mb-3">Read the data story →</a></p>
<p><strong>2. The explorable version.</strong> The same numbers with no narrative. Every cause of death the WHO tracks, sized by its share of deaths. Click a block to zoom in, hover to see the age breakdown, or search for a cause by name.</p>
<p><a href="../../lab/africa-causes-of-death-explore/" class="btn btn-primary mt-2 mb-3">Explore the numbers →</a></p>
<section id="watch-the-film" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="watch-the-film">Watch the film</h2>
<p>Prefer to watch? Here is a three-minute narrated film of the same data, from the Ebola headlines to the 8.3 million deaths that rarely make the news.</p>
<div class="quarto-video ratio ratio-16x9"><iframe data-external="1" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/5Ey06xCmkwg" title="8.3 Million: Drivers of Death in Africa, in 3 Minutes" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen=""></iframe></div>
<p><em>The narration is an AI voice (Google Gemini).</em></p>
</section>
<section id="notes-and-sources" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="notes-and-sources">Notes and Sources</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Data:</strong> World Health Organization, <em>Global Health Estimates 2021: Deaths by Cause, Age, Sex, by Country and by Region, 2000–2021</em> (2024). Licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.</li>
<li>The figures cover the 47 countries of the WHO African Region, which leaves out Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti (WHO counts them in its Eastern Mediterranean Region).</li>
<li>There is also a <a href="https://bk-advisors.github.io/africa-causes-of-death-film/">nine-minute narrated film</a> of the same data, where every dot is 1,000 people.</li>
<li>First posted on LinkedIn in July 2026.</li>
</ul>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Global Health</category>
  <category>Data Visualization</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-causes-of-death/</guid>
  <pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-causes-of-death/images/cover.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="87" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Will Africa Hit the SDG Maternal Mortality Target by 2030?</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-maternal-mortality-2030/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>A few weeks ago I posted a <a href="../../posts/africa-maternal-mortality/">snapshot of where every African country stood on maternal mortality</a>. The piece ended with a question I didn’t actually answer: will we hit the SDG promise by 2030?</p>
<p>I went and did some of the predictive analytics.</p>
<p>Of Africa’s 54 countries, 10 are on pace. The other 44 are not. Under current reduction rates, roughly 530,000 mothers will die between 2024 and 2030 in excess of what we’d see if every country was actually on a 2030 accelerated reduction trajectory. Nigeria alone accounts for over half of that gap.</p>
<p>To hit SDG 3.1 from where most of the continent sits today, we’d need to cut maternal mortality by about 11.6% every single year. The actual rate across the last two decades is closer to 2.2%. Since 2016 it has slowed to 1.5%. We are reducing at one-fifth the pace we promised.<sup>1</sup></p>
<p>The part I keep coming back to: ten countries are doing it. Some started below the line. Some, like Mozambique and Zambia, started high and reduced fast enough that their long-run trajectory lands them under 70 by 2030. They show the target is achievable.</p>
<p>The Beginnings Fund and many others are working in Africa, every day, to bend the trajectory for the rest. Staffing clinics. Training midwives. Building the referral systems that turn maternal deaths into survivable emergencies.</p>
<p>I built a small interactive viz to make the scale of the problem more visual. You can click through it scene by scene, watch every country race towards 2030, and switch between the long-run pace and the slower pace since 2016.</p>
<p><a href="../../lab/africa-mmr-2030/" class="btn btn-primary mt-2 mb-3">Open the interactive viz →</a></p>
<p>No mother should die giving life.</p>
<section id="watch-the-film" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="watch-the-film">Watch the film</h2>
<p>Prefer to watch? I made a three-minute narrated film of this story and the one before it, from Nigeria and Cabo Verde to the road to 2030.</p>
<div class="quarto-video ratio ratio-16x9"><iframe data-external="1" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/mvCMYtItptw" title="The Road to 2030: Will Africa Meet the SDG Target for Maternal Deaths?" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen=""></iframe></div>
<p><em>The narration is an AI voice (Google Gemini).</em></p>
</section>
<section id="notes-and-sources" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="notes-and-sources">Notes and Sources</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Data:</strong> World Bank indicator SH.STA.MMRT, which carries the WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and UN DESA joint estimates in <em>Trends in Maternal Mortality 2000 to 2023</em> (WHO, April 2025). Births are estimated from the World Bank crude birth rate (SP.DYN.CBRT.IN) and total population.</li>
<li><strong>On pace</strong> means a country’s observed annual rate of reduction (2000 to 2023) is at least the rate it needs to reach 70 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2030. This is my own classification; the joint estimates do not publish it.</li>
<li>The ten countries on pace: Mozambique, Zambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Seychelles, Cabo Verde, Tunisia and Egypt.</li>
<li>First posted on LinkedIn in May 2026, as a follow-up to <a href="../../posts/africa-maternal-mortality/">Only 4 of 47 African Countries Meet the SDG Maternal Mortality Target</a>.</li>
</ul>


</section>


<div id="quarto-appendix" class="default"><section id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document"><h2 class="anchored quarto-appendix-heading">Footnotes</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn1"><p><strong>Correction (1 October 2026).</strong> I have left this paragraph as I first posted it on LinkedIn, but two things in it were wrong. First, the 2.2% and 1.5% figures are worldwide rates, not Africa’s: the global maternal mortality ratio fell by an average of 2.2% a year between 2000 and 2023, and by only 1.5% a year since 2016. Second, the pace needed is faster than I wrote. According to the UN agencies that produce these estimates, the world needs to cut maternal mortality by about 14.8% every year from 2024 to 2030 to reach the SDG target, not 11.6%. So the real gap is wider than I said: since 2016 we have been reducing at about one-tenth of the pace we promised, not one-fifth. The rest of the post (10 of 54 countries on pace, about 530,000 excess deaths, Nigeria over half) comes from the data behind the interactive and still stands. Source: WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and UN DESA, <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/publications/trends-maternal-mortality-2000-2023"><em>Trends in Maternal Mortality 2000 to 2023</em></a> (2025).↩︎</p></li>
</ol>
</section></div> ]]></description>
  <category>Maternal &amp; Child Health</category>
  <category>Global Health</category>
  <category>Data Visualization</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-maternal-mortality-2030/</guid>
  <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-maternal-mortality-2030/images/cover.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="93" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Only 4 of 47 African Countries Meet the SDG Maternal Mortality Target</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-maternal-mortality/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>In 2023, a woman giving birth in Nigeria was 25 times more likely to die than one giving birth in Cabo Verde.</p>
<p>Both are African countries, albeit of different sizes, but the gap is still staggering.</p>
<p>The Sustainable Development Goal 3.1 sets a clear target: fewer than 70 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births by 2030.</p>
<p>Today, only 4 of 47 African countries meet that target: Cabo Verde (40), Seychelles (42), Algeria (62), and Mauritius (66).</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Nigeria (993), Chad (748), South Sudan (692), and the Central African Republic (692) report rates that Europe last saw a century ago.</p>
<p>Maternal mortality isn’t a mystery. We know what works and can save lives: skilled birth attendants, emergency obstetric care, family planning, and the political and financial commitment to deliver them consistently. The four countries that have crossed the SDG line built systems around exactly these basics.</p>
<p><a href="../../lab/africa-mmr/" class="btn btn-primary mt-2 mb-3">Explore the interactive chart →</a></p>
<p>It makes the disparity impossible to look away from.</p>
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-maternal-mortality/images/chart.png" class="img-fluid" alt="Bar chart: only 4 of 47 African countries meet the SDG maternal mortality target. Nigeria's rate (993) is 25 times Cabo Verde's (40)."></p>
<p>The <a href="https://beginningsfund.org/">Beginnings Fund</a> and others are doing something about this. No mother should die giving life.</p>
<section id="notes-and-sources" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="notes-and-sources">Notes and Sources</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Data:</strong> World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory, indicator MDG_0000000026, “Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)”, modelled estimates for 2023.</li>
<li>The 47 countries are the WHO African Region, which leaves out Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti (WHO counts them in its Eastern Mediterranean Region).</li>
<li>Hover over any bar in the <a href="../../lab/africa-mmr/">interactive chart</a> to see the WHO uncertainty range for each country.</li>
<li>There is a three-minute narrated film of this post and its follow-up: <a href="https://youtu.be/mvCMYtItptw">The Road to 2030</a> (narrated by an AI voice).</li>
<li>First posted on LinkedIn in May 2026. A follow-up looks ahead to 2030: <a href="../../posts/africa-maternal-mortality-2030/">Will Africa Hit the SDG Maternal Mortality Target by 2030?</a></li>
</ul>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Maternal &amp; Child Health</category>
  <category>Global Health</category>
  <category>Data Visualization</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-maternal-mortality/</guid>
  <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-maternal-mortality/images/cover.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="75" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Measles in Africa: From 1.4 Million Cases to 35,000</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-measles/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>In 1981, measles infected 1.4 million people across Africa in a single year.</p>
<p>By 2016, that number was 35,000. A 97% drop.</p>
<p>What happened? The WHO/UNICEF Measles Initiative launched mass immunization campaigns starting in 2001.</p>
<p>Countries that used to see thousands of cases per million people (e.g.&nbsp;Malawi, Zambia, Niger, Kenya) saw their numbers collapse within a few years.</p>
<p>It’s one of the most dramatic public health achievements of the last half century. But it’s hard to appreciate something you can no longer see.</p>
<p>That’s why I built this interactive heatmap. 44 years, 46 countries.</p>
<p>You can watch the red tiles fade to blue, country by country, year by year. It makes the invisible visible.</p>
<p><a href="../../lab/africa-measles/" class="btn btn-primary mt-2 mb-3">Explore the interactive heatmap →</a></p>
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-measles/images/heatmap.png" class="img-fluid" alt="Heatmap of reported measles cases per million people for each African country, 1980 to 2023. Red tiles before 2001 give way to blue after the Measles Initiative."></p>
<section id="watch-the-film" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="watch-the-film">Watch the film</h2>
<p>Prefer to watch? Here is a narrated film of the story, including what happened after 2016.</p>
<div class="quarto-video ratio ratio-16x9"><iframe data-external="1" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/IwIGgo11PzI" title="Out of Sight: How Africa Beat Measles, and Why It Came Back" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen=""></iframe></div>
<p><em>The narration is an AI voice (Google Gemini).</em></p>
</section>
<section id="notes-and-sources" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="notes-and-sources">Notes and Sources</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Data:</strong> reported measles cases from the World Health Organization’s Global Health Observatory, and population from the World Bank. 46 African countries, 1980 to 2023. The heatmap shows the countries with at least 15 years of reporting.</li>
<li>These are <strong>reported</strong> cases, so they depend on how well each country’s surveillance worked in a given year. The true number of infections was higher.</li>
<li>Much of the fall came in two waves. Reported cases had already fallen from 1.4 million in 1981 to about 490,000 in 2001, as routine childhood immunisation spread in the 1980s. After the Measles Initiative’s campaigns began in 2001, they fell a further 93% to 35,371 in 2016.</li>
<li>The gains are not permanent. Reported cases rose again to 615,194 in 2019 and were 416,476 in 2023, as outbreaks returned where vaccination coverage had slipped.</li>
<li>The data and code are on <a href="https://github.com/bk-advisors/africa-measles">GitHub</a>. First posted on LinkedIn in March 2026.</li>
</ul>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Vaccines &amp; Immunisation</category>
  <category>Global Health</category>
  <category>Data Visualization</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-measles/</guid>
  <pubDate>Sat, 14 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/africa-measles/images/cover.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="86" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Tax Revenue as the key to Sustainable Health Financing</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/tax-revenue-health-financing/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>There is a woman I buy fruit from, almost every week. She operates from a small wooden stand near my home, and she has been there for as long as I can remember. Mangoes in season, watermelon when it’s hot, jackfruit when she can find it. She knows my order before I say it.</p>
<p>One afternoon, I asked her – half-curious, half-making conversation – whether she pays any tax. She laughed so hard she nearly knocked over a pile of passion fruits. “Tax?” she said, still grinning. “For what? When my child gets sick, I take her to the health center and there’s no medicine. The road outside has had the same pothole since last year. So what exactly am I paying for?”</p>
<p>I didn’t have a good answer.</p>
<p>Her question has stayed with me because it captures something at the core of Uganda’s fiscal problem: a broken social contract. Citizens see no tangible return from their taxes, so they resist paying. The government collects too little, so it can’t deliver. And the cycle repeats.</p>
<p>As I’ve written this series on health financing, I’ve kept circling back to one question: of all the factors that determine how much a government spends on health – aid, debt, corruption, elections, inequality – which one matters most?</p>
<p>The answer, when you look at the research, is surprisingly clear. It’s tax revenue.</p>
<section id="the-8020-rule-of-health-spending" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="the-8020-rule-of-health-spending">The 80/20 Rule of Health Spending</h2>
<p>If you had to pick one factor that predicts how much a government spends on health, the research points in the same direction almost every time: domestic fiscal capacity. In plain terms, that means how much tax a country can collect.</p>
<p>The logic is almost too simple to feel like an insight. Health spending is recurrent. Doctors need salaries every month. Drug shelves need restocking every quarter. Facilities need maintenance every year. You cannot sustain these with volatile donor aid or one-off windfalls. You need predictable, domestic, recurring money. And the main source of that is taxation.</p>
<p>I find it useful to think of it as a plumbing problem. Tax revenue is the tap. Budget allocations, the Abuja Declaration targets, donor pledges – those are the buckets. You can arrange the buckets however you like, but if the tap is barely running, they won’t fill.</p>
<p>Countries at similar income levels but with different tax effort show very different health spending trajectories. Long-run increases in government health expenditure track tax revenue growth, not aid flows. When you apply an 80/20 lens to the factors behind government health spending, fiscal capacity accounts for the bulk. Everything else – institutions, aid, debt, election cycles, demographics – mostly operates through, around, or in the shadow of that one constraint.</p>
</section>
<section id="ugandas-anemic-tap" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="ugandas-anemic-tap">Uganda’s Anemic Tap</h2>
<p>So how is Uganda’s tap running? Barely.</p>
<p>Uganda’s tax-to-GDP ratio has been stuck at around 12–13% for years, below the sub-Saharan African average and well short of the government’s own targets. For every shilling of economic activity in this country, the government collects roughly 13 cents. The rest stays in the informal economy, slips through exemptions, or simply isn’t captured.</p>
<p>The downstream numbers are predictable. Uganda’s government health spending sits at roughly $23 per person per year (per UNICEF budget analysis; the WHO estimates domestic government health spending at approximately $10 per capita), against a benchmark target of $86. The health budget hovers around 7.7% of the national budget – half of the 15% we committed to under the Abuja Declaration in 2001. As I wrote in my first article in this series, government health spending per person has barely moved in a decade, while Kenya and Rwanda have pulled further and further ahead.</p>
<p>And here’s the detail that should stop us all. According to UNICEF’s budget analysis, Uganda foregoes an estimated UGX 2.881 trillion in tax revenue every single year through exemptions, allowances, rate reliefs, and deferrals. The government is choosing not to collect this money. For context, the entire approved health budget for FY 2024/25 was UGX 2.946 trillion. We are leaving almost an entire year’s health budget on the table, uncollected.</p>
<p>Pile on the fact that atleast 54% of Uganda’s economy operates informally – largely outside the tax net – and the picture becomes clearer. The tap is barely open.</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/tax-revenue-health-financing/images/tax-vs-health-spending.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption><em>The relationship between tax collection and government health spending across selected countries</em></figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
</section>
<section id="an-african-giant-turns-the-tap" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="an-african-giant-turns-the-tap">An African Giant Turns the Tap?</h2>
<p>While Uganda has been standing still on this, Nigeria has started moving.</p>
<p>In June 2025, President Bola Tinubu signed four tax reform bills into law: the Nigeria Tax Act, the Nigeria Tax Administration Act, the Nigeria Revenue Service Act, and the Joint Revenue Board Act. The ambition is to push Nigeria’s tax-to-GDP ratio to 18% over the medium term – a big jump for a country that, like us, has historically collected far too little.</p>
<p>What makes the Nigerian reforms interesting is how they try to protect the poor while expanding the base. Small businesses below a certain turnover threshold are exempt from corporate income tax, VAT, and withholding tax. Essential goods – food, healthcare, education – are exempt from VAT. And the share of VAT revenue going to states rose from 50% to 55%, which matters because states are where most health services actually get delivered.</p>
<p>Nigeria Health Watch pointed out that this expanded fiscal space gives state governments a real opportunity to invest in publicly funded health coverage. They also added a warning: “the fiscal space created by these tax reforms will not remain open forever.” Debt obligations and shifting political priorities will compete for every new naira.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s reforms have problems of their own, and implementation will be messy. But the underlying principle is sound: widen the tax base, shield the vulnerable, and deliberately channel new revenue toward social services.</p>
<p>The lesson for Uganda is that this lever exists, and other countries are pulling it. El Salvador offers an even more dramatic example. Between the 1990s and 2015, the country doubled its tax-to-GDP ratio from 8% to 16% and deliberately pushed the new revenue into health. Out-of-pocket health spending fell from 60% to below 30%. Under-five mortality dropped from 53 to 10 per 1,000 live births. That is what happens when you actually open the tap.</p>
</section>
<section id="what-can-we-do" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="what-can-we-do">What Can We Do?</h2>
<p>If tax revenue is the dominant driver of health spending, then this is where the effort has to concentrate. Three things come to mind:</p>
<section id="broaden-the-tax-base-without-crushing-the-poor" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="broaden-the-tax-base-without-crushing-the-poor">1. Broaden the tax base without crushing the poor</h3>
<p>Uganda’s informal economy is enormous – 54% of GDP – and mostly untaxed. Bringing more of it into the tax net is necessary, but it has to be done with care. Digitize tax systems. Simplify compliance for small and medium enterprises. Reduce the bureaucratic maze that discourages people from even trying. And critically, protect essential goods from tax – food, healthcare, education – so that widening the base does not mean widening the burden on those who can least carry it. Nigeria’s approach on this is worth watching.</p>
</section>
<section id="earmark-a-share-of-new-revenue-for-health" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="earmark-a-share-of-new-revenue-for-health">2. Earmark a share of new revenue for health</h3>
<p>Collecting more is only half the problem. The other half is making sure health gets its fair share. Uganda has broken its Abuja Declaration commitment for over twenty years. One mechanism to change that is earmarking: dedicate a specific portion of new tax revenue to health, as a floor, not a ceiling. This creates a direct and visible link between revenue growth and health investment. It also makes it harder for competing priorities to quietly eat the gains, which is what tends to happen when allocation decisions are left entirely to political discretion.</p>
</section>
<section id="rebuild-the-social-contract" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="rebuild-the-social-contract">3. Rebuild the social contract</h3>
<p>This is probably the hardest part, and the most important. My fruit vendor has no reason to pay tax if she never sees what it buys. Citizens need to see tangible improvements from the money they contribute – medicine on the shelves, health workers who are actually present, roads that don’t swallow motorcycles. This is a trust problem as much as it is a collection problem. And trust gets rebuilt one visible improvement at a time.</p>
<p>A UN dialogue on domestic resource mobilization in Uganda identified low public confidence in how government uses funds as one of the biggest barriers to tax compliance. That finding should surprise nobody. Fixing the confidence gap is as urgent as fixing the tax code itself.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="the-root-of-the-root" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="the-root-of-the-root">The Root of the Root</h2>
<p>Over these past months, I’ve been writing about why Uganda and much of Africa underinvests in health. Donor displacement. Debt. Corruption. Inequality. Elections. Each piece of the puzzle is real, and each one matters.</p>
<p>But the more I dig into this, the more I see that they are all branches of the same tree. And the root of that tree is fiscal capacity – how much money the government can actually raise from its own citizens and its own economy. If the tap is dry, it doesn’t much matter how cleverly you arrange the buckets.</p>
<p>If we get taxation right – broaden the base, protect the poor, direct revenue to health, and give citizens a reason to trust the system – we lay the foundation for everything else. If we don’t, we will keep circling the same problems, decade after decade, with slightly different labels.</p>
<p>The woman who sells me fruit every week doesn’t need a lecture on fiscal policy. She needs a deal that makes sense: you put something in, and something comes back. A clinic that has medicine. A nurse who shows up. A road without a crater.</p>
<p>Until we can offer her that deal, the tap stays dry, and the buckets stay empty.</p>
</section>
<section id="notes-references" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="notes-references">Notes &amp; References</h2>
<ol type="1">
<li>World Bank, 2025. <em>Uganda Economic Update: Increasing Uganda’s Fiscal Space through Improved Revenue Mobilization</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda/publication/increasing-uganda-s-fiscal-space-through-improved-revenue-mobilization-and-enhanced-efficiency-of-spending-and-service-d" class="uri">https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda/publication/increasing-uganda-s-fiscal-space-through-improved-revenue-mobilization-and-enhanced-efficiency-of-spending-and-service-d</a></li>
<li>UNICEF, 2024. <em>Uganda Health Sector Budget Brief 2024/25</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.unicef.org/esa/media/13261/file/UNICEF-Uganda-Health-Budget-Brief-2023-2024.pdf" class="uri">https://www.unicef.org/esa/media/13261/file/UNICEF-Uganda-Health-Budget-Brief-2023-2024.pdf</a></li>
<li>UNICEF, 2025. <em>Health Sector Financing: Analysis and Strategic Recommendations (FY2025/26)</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.unicef.org/uganda/media/20426/file/2025-2026%20Health%20Sector%20Budget%20Brief.pdf" class="uri">https://www.unicef.org/uganda/media/20426/file/2025-2026%20Health%20Sector%20Budget%20Brief.pdf</a></li>
<li>United Nations Uganda, 2025. <em>Leveraging Domestic Resource Mobilization as a Cornerstone of Uganda’s Sustainable Development Path</em>. Available at: <a href="https://uganda.un.org/en/296986-leveraging-domestic-resource-mobilization-cornerstone-ugandas-sustainable-development-path" class="uri">https://uganda.un.org/en/296986-leveraging-domestic-resource-mobilization-cornerstone-ugandas-sustainable-development-path</a></li>
<li>Nigeria Health Watch, 2025. <em>Will the 2025 Tax Reform Deliver for Nigeria’s Health System?</em> Available at: <a href="https://articles.nigeriahealthwatch.com/will-the-2025-tax-reform-deliver-for-nigerias-health-system-it-depends-on-how-governments-and-the-rest-of-us-respond/" class="uri">https://articles.nigeriahealthwatch.com/will-the-2025-tax-reform-deliver-for-nigerias-health-system-it-depends-on-how-governments-and-the-rest-of-us-respond/</a></li>
<li>PwC Nigeria, 2025. <em>The Nigerian Tax Reform Acts</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/publications/the-nigerian-tax-reform-acts.html" class="uri">https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/publications/the-nigerian-tax-reform-acts.html</a></li>
<li>WHO, 2024. <em>Global Health Expenditure Database</em>. Available at: <a href="https://apps.who.int/nha/database" class="uri">https://apps.who.int/nha/database</a></li>
<li>WHO, 2023. <em>Health Financing Progress Matrix Assessment: Uganda</em>. Available at: <a href="https://library.health.go.ug/sites/default/files/resources/WHO%20HFPM%20Uganda%20FINAL.pdf" class="uri">https://library.health.go.ug/sites/default/files/resources/WHO%20HFPM%20Uganda%20FINAL.pdf</a></li>
</ol>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Tax &amp; Domestic Resource Mobilisation</category>
  <category>Health Financing</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/tax-revenue-health-financing/</guid>
  <pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/tax-revenue-health-financing/images/cover.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="114" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>The Public Health Cost of General Elections</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/public-health-cost-of-elections/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<section id="when-politics-sets-the-health-calendar" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="when-politics-sets-the-health-calendar">When politics sets the health calendar</h2>
<p>For most of 2025, I have been in meeting rooms in Papua New Guinea talking about a vaccine that many Ugandans have now almost taken for granted: HPV.</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/public-health-cost-of-elections/images/png-stakeholders.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>Meeting with stakeholders in PNG</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<p>PNG has one of the highest cervical cancer burdens in the Asia Pacific region. Recent estimates suggest around 1,053 women are diagnosed with cervical cancer every year and roughly 650 die, in a country with a much smaller population than Uganda. That is like wiping out several extended families every year.</p>
<p>The evidence is strong that HPV vaccination, combined with screening and treatment, can prevent a large share of these deaths over the coming decades. Statistical modelling shows that scaling up HPV vaccination and cervical screening in countries like PNG could avert tens of thousands of deaths in the long term.</p>
<p>The science is clear. One of the stumbling blocks, in this case, is general elections.</p>
<p>A senior health leader in PNG told us very calmly in one planning meeting: if the national HPV campaign does not happen in 2026, it will be extremely difficult to run it in 2027 because of the general elections and the tribal tensions that usually follow. In her view, the next realistic window might only be three years later.</p>
<p>In practice, this means an entire cohort of girls could pass through adolescence without getting the vaccine on time. Since HPV vaccination is most effective before sexual debut, those missed years translate into a permanently higher lifetime risk of cervical cancer for that group.</p>
<p>That experience in PNG made something click for me. Elections are not just moments when our political leaders change (or not). They quietly decide who lives long enough to see those leaders govern.</p>
</section>
<section id="elections-as-public-health-events" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="elections-as-public-health-events">Elections as public health events</h2>
<p>If you zoom out from PNG and Uganda and look at the wider literature, a pattern starts to appear. Whenever there is serious political unrest or conflict, routine health services tend to suffer. This is the underlying thesis for this article, which is backed by systematic reviews of conflict settings that show drops in vaccination coverage and increases in vaccine preventable disease outbreaks when insecurity disrupts outreach and facility services.</p>
<p>Uganda is not in a civil war, but our elections bring their own version of instability. The 2021 elections were described by Human Rights Watch as marred by killings, beatings of opposition supporters, arbitrary arrests and an internet shutdown. Even the Afrobarometer 2025 survey reports that close to half of Ugandans fear intimidation or violence during elections, and many worry about the role of security forces.</p>
<p>Our neighbors have similar stories. The post election crisis in Kenya in 2007 and 2008 left around 1,133 people dead and orders of magnitude more displaced from their homes. The more recent election violence in Tanzania, also saw a reported 500 people killed. Elections can be scheduled on a calendar, but the human consequences spill out for years.</p>
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/public-health-cost-of-elections/images/election-violence.jpg" class="img-fluid"></p>
<p>With that backdrop, let me unpack three ways elections show up as a public health issue: in lives lost, in disrupted care and in frozen policy.</p>
</section>
<section id="lives-lost-and-mental-health-scars" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="lives-lost-and-mental-health-scars">1. Lives lost and mental health scars</h2>
<p>The most visible cost is the people who never come back home.</p>
<p>In Uganda, at least 54 people were killed in November 2020 when security forces cracked down on protests after the arrest of opposition politician Bobi Wine. Those numbers are not abstract to families who buried loved ones. Add on other incidents around campaigns and polling days, and elections start to look like a recurring risk factor for young men in particular.</p>
<p>What we rarely talk about is the mental health side. Exposure to political violence, even if you are not physically injured, is linked in many studies to higher rates of anxiety, depression and post traumatic stress symptoms. Children who see their parents beaten or arrested do not simply “move on”. Their sense of safety in the world shrinks.</p>
<p>Uganda already has a large unmet need for mental health care, with few specialists and limited services outside a handful of facilities. Election related violence adds one more layer to that backlog.</p>
</section>
<section id="disrupted-access-and-broken-supply-chains" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="disrupted-access-and-broken-supply-chains">2. Disrupted access and broken supply chains</h2>
<p>Even when bullets are not flying, fear changes behavior. In the run up to tense elections, people often stay home more. They avoid being out at night. They delay any trip that feels optional. In health terms, that matters.</p>
<p>I sometimes imagine an expectant mother in the more rural parts of my home district of Wakiso. She has been advised to deliver at a facility, but her due date is close to the election and there are rumors of roadblocks and protests on her road. She weighs the risk of travelling while there might be protests or tear gas against the risk of staying home. That is a public health decision shaped almost entirely by politics.</p>
<p>We know from other settings that insecurity is associated with reduced facility visits, lower vaccination uptake and interruptions in chronic disease treatment. Uganda saw similar dynamics when Covid related enforcement operations turned violent, including beatings and shootings by security forces. The message many people heard was simple: being outside can be dangerous.</p>
<p>On top of that, staff may struggle to reach facilities when transport is disrupted or when they themselves fear being caught in violence. Supply trucks can be delayed if major roads are blocked or if security operations intensify. A two week delay in ARVs or TB drugs can have lifelong consequences for patients.</p>
</section>
<section id="policy-paralysis-and-budget-drift" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="policy-paralysis-and-budget-drift">3. Policy paralysis and budget drift</h2>
<p>The third impact feels more technical, but it is very real.</p>
<p>Big health reforms and campaigns rely on long, boring, bureaucratic work: drafting guidelines, costing plans, pushing procurement, negotiating budget lines. Election seasons interrupt that slow grind. Officials become cautious. Difficult decisions get postponed. New initiatives are quietly shifted to “after elections”.</p>
<p>You can see this in PNG, where planners worry that a national HPV rollout will not be feasible in the same year as general elections. Modelling suggests that delaying HPV vaccination by several years can significantly reduce the number of cervical cancer deaths averted by 2070 and beyond. That is what a policy pause looks like in health terms: a flatter line on the “deaths prevented” graph.</p>
<p>Budgets can also drift. Election years often see more money and attention move toward security and highly visible infrastructure. Analyses of electoral violence in Uganda describe it as a recurring threat to human security that shapes how the state deploys its resources. Each shilling moved away from essential medicines or health workers is a choice, even if it is never debated in public.</p>
</section>
<section id="why-being-apolitical-is-hard-when-you-care-about-public-health" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="why-being-apolitical-is-hard-when-you-care-about-public-health">Why “Being Apolitical” is hard when you care about public health</h2>
<p>So what does this mean for someone like my niece, or for you reading this?</p>
<p>You do not have to attend rallies or wear party colors to be involved in politics. If you care about whether an ambulance can reach your home during unrest, or whether your child gets a vaccine on time, you are already in the political conversation, whether you like it or not.</p>
<p>Elections influence:</p>
<ul>
<li>How safe it feels to move to a health facility.</li>
<li>Whether critical campaigns, like HPV or polio, go ahead on schedule.</li>
<li>How budgets are divided between treating disease and controlling dissent.</li>
</ul>
<p>Being “apolitical” in that context often just means being silent about decisions that still shape your health.</p>
<p>That does not mean everyone must turn into a full time activist. It can simply mean asking different questions. When parties and candidates come to your community, you can ask how they plan to keep health workers and patients safe during campaigns. You can ask what safeguards exist to prevent budget cuts to health in election years. You can insist that peaceful elections are part of a healthy society, not an optional extra.</p>
<p>My hope for Uganda in January 2026 is simple. I want an election where hospitals remain functional, where health centers stay open without fear, and where children can look at a red roof and see only paint, not a threat.</p>
<p>Happy holidays everyone and stay safe.</p>
</section>
<section id="notes-references" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="notes-references">Notes &amp; References</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://hpvcentre.net/statistics/reports/PNG.pdf" class="uri">https://hpvcentre.net/statistics/reports/PNG.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/electoral-violence-kenya" class="uri">https://www.cfr.org/report/electoral-violence-kenya</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence" class="uri">https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz0x8vdvkjgo" class="uri">https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz0x8vdvkjgo</a></li>
</ul>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Global Health</category>
  <category>Political Economy</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/public-health-cost-of-elections/</guid>
  <pubDate>Tue, 09 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/public-health-cost-of-elections/images/cover.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="80" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>The Matthew Effect</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/the-matthew-effect/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>There’s a well-known line in the Gospel of Matthew (The Parable of The Talents) that reads:</p>
<blockquote class="blockquote">
<p><em>“For unto everyone who has, more will be given, and he will have an abundance. But from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.” — Matthew 25:29</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>I don’t mean to start this post with a sermon, but it’s a verse that runs through my head constantly as I write about topics I care about, especially: the need to direct more impact investments toward the social sector.</p>
<p>I reflect on this passage because it so accurately describes a core feature of our world: how wealth, power, and opportunity gradually concentrate in the hands of a few (“the haves”), often leaving the majority (the “have-nots”) perpetually behind, through arguably and in many cases, no fault of their own.</p>
<p>And it’s not an accident - it’s a feature of our current financial and economic system that is designed to concentrate extreme wealth in the hands of a few. In this post, I want to explore why this happens and what the broader implications are.</p>
<section id="cumulative-advantage" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="cumulative-advantage">Cumulative Advantage</h2>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/the-matthew-effect/images/capital-21st-century.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>Capital in the Twenty-First Century</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<p>One of the best books I’ve read on this is “Capital in the 21st Century” by French economist Thomas Piketty. His core thesis, backed by extensive historical data, reveals two key points:</p>
<ol type="1">
<li><p>The Rate of Return on Capital (R) - the money generated by owning assets like stocks in companies, government bonds/T-bills, and real estate - has consistently outpaced…</p></li>
<li><p>…the Rate of Economic Growth (g) - the growth of the wider economy, which dictates wage increases for most people.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>In short, Piketty’s famous formula is R &gt; g.</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/the-matthew-effect/images/r-greater-than-g.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>R &gt; g</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<p>This simple inequality equation is the engine driving the widening wealth gap.</p>
<p>Like many in my network, you are probably on the “have” side of this equation. You likely possess assets, forms of “Capital”, such as a university education, real estate, investment portfolios, or even strong professional connections. These assets tend to grow, accumulate, and compound over time, steadily increasing your wealth.</p>
<p>However, for those who do not own such capital, their primary path to a better income is through wages, which are tied to economic growth (g). When ‘g’ stagnates at 3-5% per year while ‘R’ compounds at a higher rate (e.g.&nbsp;10+%), you can visualize the widening gap.</p>
<p>That is the Matthew Effect in action: wealth breeding more wealth for a few.</p>
<p>Like I’ve shared with many friends and family, this growing inequality isn’t just an inconvenient trend; it’s a ticking time bomb of civil unrest that, if not rebalanced, threatens everyone’s wellbeing.</p>
</section>
<section id="the-reverse-matthew-effect" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="the-reverse-matthew-effect">The Reverse Matthew Effect</h2>
<p>But there’s a second, more devastating part to that verse: <em>“…from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.”</em></p>
<p>This is the reverse effect, and it describes the profound vulnerability of those on the “have-not” side of the equation.</p>
<p>I’m reminded of the tragedy that occurred at the Kiteezi landfill here in Kampala, last year, where a collapse of the waste dump tragically killed over 30 people.</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/the-matthew-effect/images/kiteezi-landfill.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>Kiteezi</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<p>Let’s think about this in the context of the Matthew Effect. These individuals were the definition of “him who has not.” They possessed almost no financial capital. What little they “had” was their physical presence, their proximity to a meager livelihood (scavenging recyclable materials), and, in the most basic sense, their lives.</p>
<p>The system they existed in was not only failing to provide them with opportunities (the ‘g’ in Piketty’s formula) but was actively dangerous. When the landfill collapsed, the system didn’t just fail them; it took away everything - even the little they had.</p>
<p>This is a cumulative dis-advantage. It’s not just that the poor get left behind; it’s that they are disproportionately exposed to systemic shocks like environmental disasters, health crises, and economic downturns. They have no “capital” to buffer them from catastrophe. When a crisis hits, it doesn’t just halt their progress; it erases it, sending them tumbling backward, often irretrievably.</p>
</section>
<section id="rebalancing-the-equation" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="rebalancing-the-equation">Rebalancing the Equation</h2>
<p>This brings me back to why I write these articles. Our current system, as described by the Matthew Effect (R &gt; g), excels at creating and compounding private wealth. It is, by its very design, incapable of solving the problems of the “have-nots” or protecting them from the “Reverse Matthew Effect.”</p>
<p>Waiting for economic growth (g) to “trickle down” is not a solution; it’s a passive acceptance of the gap.</p>
<p>This is where the social sector and impact investing become critical. They are not charity in the old-fashioned sense. They are a tool for rebalancing.</p>
<p>Directing capital to social enterprises, non-profits, and community initiatives is a conscious choice to build buffers for the vulnerable. It’s about investing in resilience, creating opportunity where the market tends to see none, and building systems (like better housing, better education, and access to healthcare) that can potentially prevent tragedies like Kiteezi from re-occuring.</p>
<p>Governments must also adopt a more progressive tax policy to curb extreme wealth concentration and increase revenues to allocate more domestic investment into the social sector.</p>
<p>We, “the haves,” cannot insulate ourselves from the consequences of a world defined by this stark divide. Rebalancing the system isn’t just an act of compassion, it’s really an act of collective survival. It is the only way to defuse the ticking time bomb and build an economy and systems that offers true abundance, not just for a few, but for all.</p>
<p><em>“…to whom much is given, much is expected.” — Luke 12:48.</em></p>
</section>
<section id="notes-references" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="notes-references">Notes &amp; References</h2>
<ul>
<li>Piketty, Thomas. <em>Capital in the Twenty-First Century</em>. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Belknap Press, 2017.</li>
<li><a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-learns-hard-lessons-from-fatal-garbage-landslide/a-69995224" class="uri">https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-learns-hard-lessons-from-fatal-garbage-landslide/a-69995224</a></li>
<li><a href="https://pudding.cool/2022/12/yard-sale/" class="uri">https://pudding.cool/2022/12/yard-sale/</a> — a fascinating visual essay describing the same idea</li>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_in_the_Twenty-First_Century" class="uri">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_in_the_Twenty-First_Century</a></li>
<li>It’s not lost on me, as I wrote this piece, that my name is “Matthew”, so maybe I have to provide a disclaimer, haha — I have no direct relation to this Effect…</li>
</ul>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Political Economy</category>
  <category>Global Health</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/the-matthew-effect/</guid>
  <pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/the-matthew-effect/images/cover.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="81" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Why do honest people become corrupt politicians?</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/honest-people-corrupt-politicians/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>Agnes Nandutu’s career as a journalist was as respected and successful as they come.</p>
<p>She hosted and voiced over a popular TV segment called “Point Blank” that poked fun at Ugandan politicians with the kind of satire and comedic timing that made us, her loyal audience, tear up with laughter. In the early 2010s, she was the rare kind of public figure we trusted to speak truth to power and make us laugh along the way.</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/honest-people-corrupt-politicians/images/point-blank.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>NTV’s Point Blank</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<p>In 2021, she decided to turn the popularity into a run for Parliament, representing her home district of Bududa, and she won!</p>
<p>But not only that, President Museveni added some icing on her cake and appointed her State Minister for Karamoja affairs, responsible for one of Uganda’s poorest regions.</p>
<p>She was truly on the rise.</p>
<p>Then in 2023, a corruption scandal broke. Roofing iron sheets, meant to build homes for the poor in Karamoja, had been misappropriated.</p>
<p>At the center of it all: Agnes. The once honest journalist admitted her involvement.</p>
<p>The question many of us asked was: How does someone go from exposing politicians on TV to practicing those same vices, once in office?</p>
<p>The rapper Ice-T said it best - “Don’t hate the playa, hate the game”, which still applies in this case. The game of journalism is different from the game of politics.</p>
<p>And the key to understanding corrupt behavior in politics does not lie solely in the individual. It primarily lies in the system of incentives in the political arena.</p>
<p>Coincidentally, one of the tools that we can use to analyze the decision making process of politicians is called, “Game Theory”.</p>
<section id="what-is-game-theory" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="what-is-game-theory">What is Game Theory?</h2>
<p>At its core, Game Theory is the study of strategic decision-making. Think of it like a game of chess. Your best move depends entirely on the move you expect your opponent to make. It’s a framework for analyzing situations where the outcome of your choices depends on the choices of others.</p>
<p>In any “game,” players want to maximize their payoffs, whether that payoff is money, power, or simply winning. Game Theory helps us understand why a rational person might make a seemingly irrational or immoral choice, simply because the rules and the other players’ expected actions make it the most logical move for them personally.</p>
<p>One of the most famous concepts in Game Theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and it perfectly illustrates the political trap Agnes Nandutu and others find themselves in.</p>
<section id="the-prisoners-dilemma" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="the-prisoners-dilemma">The prisoner’s dilemma</h3>
<p>The classic Prisoner’s Dilemma goes like this: Two partners in crime are arrested and held in separate cells, with no way to communicate. The prosecutor offers each of them the same deal:</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/honest-people-corrupt-politicians/images/prisoners-dilemma.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>Prisoner’s Dilemma</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<ul>
<li>If you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner stays silent, you go free. Your partner gets 10 years in prison.</li>
<li>If you both stay silent, you both get a minor charge, serving only 1 year.</li>
<li>If you both confess and implicate each other, you both get 5 years.</li>
</ul>
<p>What would you do?</p>
<p>From a collective standpoint, the best outcome is for both to stay silent (cooperate with each other) and serve only one year. But from an <em>individual</em> standpoint, that’s a huge risk. What if your partner rats you out to save themselves? Then you’re the idiot who gets 10 years.</p>
<p>No matter what your partner does, confessing (or “snitching”) always seems like the safer bet for you personally. If they stay silent, you go free. If they confess, you get 5 years instead of 10. The result? Both prisoners, acting in their own rational self-interest, confess and end up with a worse outcome than if they had just trusted each other.</p>
<p>This is the game many politicians are forced to play.</p>
</section>
<section id="the-politicians-dilemma" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="the-politicians-dilemma">The politician’s dilemma</h3>
<p>Let’s reframe the Prisoner’s Dilemma for a Ugandan politician. The choices aren’t about confessing or staying silent; they are about being Honest or being Corrupt.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Be Honest:</strong> You refuse to divert public funds, follow every procurement rule, and wait for the slow-moving official government programs to (maybe) reach your constituents.</li>
<li><strong>Be Corrupt:</strong> You divert resources (like those iron sheets) to directly benefit your voters, support networks, and personal coffers.</li>
</ul>
<p>Now, let’s look at the payoffs in a political system with weak institutions and high public expectations:</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/honest-people-corrupt-politicians/images/politicians-dilemma.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>Politician’s Dilemma</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<ol type="1">
<li><p><strong>You are Honest, but other politicians are Corrupt:</strong> This is the “idiot’s payoff”. While you wait for official channels, other MPs are delivering tangible goods to <em>their</em> people. They are building schools, paying funeral expenses, and handing out cash. At the next election, your constituents see you as ineffective and useless. You followed the rules, but you lost the game. You are voted out.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>You are Corrupt, and other politicians are Honest:</strong> This is the jackpot. You gain a massive advantage, looking like a hero who “delivers” for your people while others seem slow and bureaucratic. Your political survival is almost guaranteed.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Everyone is Honest:</strong> This would be the ideal outcome for the country. Public services improve for everyone, and trust in the government grows. However, for an individual politician, it means you can’t outshine your rivals with patronage.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Everyone is Corrupt:</strong> This is the political reality in many places. The country as a whole suffers, but for the individual politician, it’s the rational choice for survival. You get the resources to satisfy immediate constituent demands, secure your position, and compete with your peers who are doing the exact same thing. The risk of getting caught is low, and the risk of being an honest but “ineffective” politician is career suicide.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>I like to think of the old Agnes Nandutu, the journalist, as a “match commentator” of sorts. Her incentive was to expose the fouls in the game. But when she became a player on the field, a MP, the incentives flipped entirely. Her survival as a politician, her ability to meet the demands of her constituents in Bududa, and her standing among her peers all depended on playing the game by its unwritten, dare I say - corrupt rules.</p>
<p>Her choice to divert those iron sheets wasn’t necessarily a sudden moral collapse. It was a calculated move in a system where the incentives overwhelmingly reward corruption and punish honesty. To fix the problem, we can’t just focus on the morality of the players - that’s an attribution fallacy. We have to change the rules of the game itself - by strengthening institutions, demanding accountability, and rewarding transparency, thereby making honesty the truly rational choice.</p>


</section>
</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Political Economy</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/honest-people-corrupt-politicians/</guid>
  <pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/honest-people-corrupt-politicians/images/cover.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="92" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>When 1 + 1 is NOT equal to 2.</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/displacement-effect/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<section id="the-math-is-not-math-ing" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="the-math-is-not-math-ing"><strong>The Math is not “Math-ing”</strong></h3>
<p>Would you believe me if I told you that, when it comes to public health spending, in Africa; “1 + 1” is NOT equal to “2” ?</p>
<p>Crazy assertion, I know. But let me explain what I mean by that.</p>
<p>The phenomenon I’ve described above is known as the “displacement effect”,</p>
<p>where an increase is funding to public health from external donors, leads to the government spending less on public health. It works something like this:</p>
<ol type="1">
<li><p><strong>Let’s say the total needed</strong> for adequate health spending <strong>per person per year is $100</strong>, in African Country X.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>The government typically, on average, spends $50 per person</strong> on public health per year (wishful thinking, know. But play along)</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Then the donors arrive and offer to spend an additional $30 per person</strong> on public health programs (what donors call, “catalytic investments” to ignite the government to spend even more on health and meet the targeted $100 per person</p></li>
<li><p>**But the government says, “Great! We’ll reduce our initial $50 to $10** per person, now that we’ve got a whole $30 covered by donors.”</p></li>
</ol>
<p>The Result? The health funding gap remains. Instead of an increase in domestic funding, there’s backsliding.</p>
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/displacement-effect/images/before_after_displacement_labels_v2.gif" class="img-fluid"></p>
<p>One study (IHME 2013) quantified this phenomena further to say that:</p>
<blockquote class="blockquote">
<p>For every $1 a donor spends on public health in Africa, the government reduces its own health spending by up to $1.14.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Let that sink in, for a moment.</p>
<p>Like I said, “1 + 1” is NOT equal to “2”. The Math is not “Math-ing”.</p>
<p>Its kind of like if your child received a partial scholarship as a contribution to their school fees, for say good performance, but instead of stepping up as a parent and paying the balance - you instead stop paying school fees altogether and use the money you had to buy the new iPhone.</p>
<p>It makes no sense, I know. But that’s how our governments actually operate.</p>
</section>
<section id="misaligned-incentives" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="misaligned-incentives"><strong>Misaligned Incentives</strong></h3>
<p>At the core of this “displacement effect” is something very common in society - misaligned incentives. Because at the end of the day, governments are run by humans not robots. And humans respond to incentives.</p>
<p>Hence, when our leaders know that donors will keep funding public health, they will move that previously earmarked domestic funding for health, elsewhere e.g.&nbsp;To areas that that will win them votes in the next election cycle and secure their power.</p>
</section>
<section id="so-what-can-we-do-to-align-incentives" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="so-what-can-we-do-to-align-incentives"><strong>So what can we do to align incentives?</strong></h3>
<p>Obviously the fix isn’t to just get rid of donors, which is like throwing the baby out with the bath water.</p>
<p>Instead, we need to change how donors give in 3 key ways:</p>
<ol type="1">
<li><p>Tie external donor funding to domestic co-financing efforts</p></li>
<li><p>Avoid siloed funding and prioritize system-wide support</p></li>
<li><p>Country ownership through a single-plan that donors plug into</p></li>
</ol>
</section>
<section id="tie-external-donor-funding-to-domestic-co-financing-efforts" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="tie-external-donor-funding-to-domestic-co-financing-efforts"><strong>1 Tie external donor funding to domestic co-financing efforts</strong></h3>
<p>Essentially, donors need to say, “We’ll give you $1, but only if you spend $1 too”.</p>
<p>Organizations like <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/gavi/"><strong>Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance</strong></a> and others have been doing this for decades, and it works because instead of displacing domestic health spending, you incentive more of it by rewarding shared funding commitments - as part of a co-financing model.</p>
</section>
<section id="avoid-siloed-funding-and-prioritize-system-wide-support" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="avoid-siloed-funding-and-prioritize-system-wide-support"><strong>2 Avoid siloed funding and prioritize system-wide support</strong></h3>
<p>To date, most donor funding tends to go into targeted vertical programs i.e.&nbsp;disease or population - specific programs (think HIV, Malaria, Immunization, etc…) that are mostly easy to measure and market.</p>
<p>But the problem is: That’s how you end up with health centers which can test for HIV and Malaria, but have no Panadol and no toilets for patients.</p>
<p>Hence, its important to take an integrated and health system wide approach to funding - that thinks of the health sector as an ecosystem of interconnected parts, because if we only fund the “marketable and sexy” parts, the whole thing will eventually collapse - like a house of cards.</p>
</section>
<section id="country-ownership-through-a-single-coordinated-plan-that-donors-plug-into" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="country-ownership-through-a-single-coordinated-plan-that-donors-plug-into"><strong>3 Country ownership through a single coordinated plan that donors plug into</strong></h3>
<p>You can have all the resources (both financial and otherwise) in the world, but if you cannot coordinate and direct them towards impactful goals, then they’re useless. That’s actually (come to think of it) a key African problem, even beyond public health.</p>
<p>That’s why countries like Rwanda, that have managed to successfully implement donor coordination mechanisms are great role models of best-in-class examples of how public health programs financing should be done in Africa. Fundamentally, their system works like this:</p>
<ol type="1">
<li><p>The Rwandan Ministry of Health develops and costs their National Health Sector Strategic Plan based on sector-wide stakeholder consultations - particularly from the lower administrative units and community/village networks</p></li>
<li><p>They then use this single strategic plan as a resource mobilization tool by sharing it with donors for alignment</p></li>
<li><p>Donors then plug-into this single plan to close any funding gaps, based on shared priorities with the government</p></li>
</ol>
<p>That’s the definition of country ownership. The Rwanda case is unique, not because other African countries haven’t tried similar coordination models - its unique because Rwanda’s approach is bottom-up and includes intensive consultation from communities and local governments, before its taken-up for central government and donor funding</p>
<hr>
<p>When our government partners-up financially with donors the logical expectation is that their combined investments should increase the overall pool of resources available to enhance the public good i.e.&nbsp;“1 + 1” should be equal to “2”</p>
<p>But for many years that has not been the case in many African countries because of the displacement effect and other factors (which I’ll touch on in subsequent posts).</p>
<p>Hence, its imperative that we change this dynamic , going forward, through some of the ways I’ve proposed above, if we ever want to see real and sustained impact on the ground. I’ll leave you with the words of <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/dambisamoyo/"><strong>Baroness Dambisa Moyo</strong></a> :</p>
<blockquote class="blockquote">
<p>No country has ever achieved economic success by depending on aid to the degree that many African countries do</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
</section>
<section id="references" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="references"><strong>References</strong></h3>
<ul>
<li><p>Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, 2023. <em>Co-financing policy</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.gavi.org/programmes-impact/programmatic-policies/co-financing-policy"><strong>https://www.gavi.org/programmes-impact/programmatic-policies/co-financing-policy</strong></a> [Accessed 10 August 2025].</p></li>
<li><p>World Health Organization, 2024. <em>Global Health Expenditure Database (GHED)</em>. Geneva: WHO. Available at: <a href="https://apps.who.int/nha/database"><strong>https://apps.who.int/nha/database</strong></a> [Accessed 10 August 2025]</p></li>
<li><p>IHME, 2013. Global Health Metrics &amp; Evaluation Conference on Health Financing. Seattle, WA: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. Available at: <a href="https://youtu.be/c1Jlz9_TbMc?si=eygh-5LBbO8wUa-u"><strong>https://youtu.be/c1Jlz9_TbMc?si=eygh-5LBbO8wUa-u</strong></a> [Accessed 10 August 2025]</p></li>
<li><p>Parfait Uwaliraye et al., 2024. Rwanda’s Single Project Implementation Unit: An Effective Donor Coordination Platform in the Journey to Achieving Universal Health Coverage. <em>Health Systems and Reforms</em>, Vol. 10. Issue 3. Perspectives on implementing objective-oriented health reforms. Available at: <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23288604.2024.2403527#abstract"><strong>https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23288604.2024.2403527#abstract</strong></a> [Accessed 10 August 2025]</p></li>
</ul>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Health Financing</category>
  <category>Global Health</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/displacement-effect/</guid>
  <pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/displacement-effect/images/before_n_after_donor_funding_visual_v2.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>The Cost of Staying Alive in Uganda</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/health-financing/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>A few month ago, my Mom had stroke.</p>
<p>It happened in our village, Pacego in Pakwach district, a quiet stretch of North Western Uganda where the River Nile takes its time and most locals tend to do the same. My mother is retired and living a mostly peaceful existence. The kind of life you imagine when when you think of someone easing into their later years.</p>
<p>Then came the stroke.</p>
<p>No warning. Just the quiet attack of two deadly enemies many don’t see coming - high blood pressure and diabetes. Neither screams or shows up when you expect. However when they do arrive, they demand attention you’re rarely prepared to give.</p>
<p>My siblings and I raced up North to Pakwach from Kampala, terrified but trying not to show it. Once we reached, we got her admitted into a private clinic in Pakwach town. She was stabilized, spent the night being monitored, and was discharged the following day. We took her home. The bill was 489,200 Ugandan shillings. About $130.</p>
<p>That $130 is now the most important money I’ve ever spent.</p>
<p>But here’s the thing that won’t leave me alone: my mother survived the worst because we had that money. Many people’s mothers don’t survive because they simply didn’t have the cash to pay for better treatment. This is a common experience in Uganda, where survival is often about how much cash is in your pocket.</p>
<p>That’s a terrifying way to live.</p>
<section id="when-health-systems-fail-us" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="when-health-systems-fail-us"><strong>When Health Systems Fail Us</strong></h2>
<p>Most people think of the healthcare system in terms of Infrastructure, Budget allocations and Medical Personnel. But its really about whether your mother gets to come home. It’s about whether your neighbor dies quietly because they couldn’t afford their medication. That’s the really impact of a failing system.</p>
<p>Between 2012 and 2022, Uganda’s government health spending per person barely changed and has hovered around USD 10 per person, while this same measure doubled for our neighbors in Kenya ($21 to $42 per person) and Rwanda ($15 to $27 per person).</p>
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<p>That stagnation in government health spending doesn’t show up in newspaper headlines, but it shows up in empty drug shelves, exhausted health workers, and mothers praying their child’s fever breaks because they can’t afford to treat it. In Uganda, when illness comes, debt is usually not far behind, and if debt doesn’t come, death just might…</p>
<p>In more advanced economies,seeking healthcare feels like being on a conveyor belt of a well oiled mechanical system, that just works like clock-work. Here, it feels like a gamble, between life and death.</p>
</section>
<section id="systems-do-exactly-what-theyre-designed-to-do." class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="systems-do-exactly-what-theyre-designed-to-do."><strong>Systems Do Exactly What They’re Designed To Do.</strong></h2>
<p>Our innate tendency is to assume failure comes from chaos or neglect. However, most of the time, systems work the way they were built. If the healthcare system leaves people behind, it’s because that’s how we’ve chosen (passively or otherwise) for it to function.</p>
<p>But its not all doom and gloom, here’s the hopeful part: Anything built by humans can be redesigned and rebuilt.</p>
<p>We could, for instance:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Double down on prevention.</strong> High blood pressure and diabetes don’t need to be death sentences if we screen ourselves early and improve health education and sensitization. These are thought of as boring interventions, until they save someone you love.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Align incentives.</strong> Since its human beings (specifically leaders) that make decisions about how resources are allocated, and these same leaders (politicians and industrialists) will only change if they are incentivized. We have to accept the simple fact that policy decisions and resource allocations are based more on political and economic incentives than social incentives, hence our focus should be on strategically aligning the three.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Honor our promises.</strong> In 2001, Uganda and many other African countries committed to spending 15% of the national budget on health under the Abuja Declaration. We have never got close. To change the tide, that promise has to be kept because its an indicator of what we value and prioritize as a country: Health first, before everything else.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Learn from Rwanda.</strong> Their national health insurance works. Ours doesn’t exist. Theirs proves it can be done. The only difference is values, priorities and execution.</p></li>
</ul>
</section>
<section id="what-were-actually-talking-about" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="what-were-actually-talking-about"><strong>What We’re Actually Talking About</strong></h2>
<p>This story isn’t about my mother. It’s not even about health.</p>
<p>It’s about about what the Ugandan Lawyer, David F.K. Mpanga, calls having a central nervous system to feel each others pain.</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/health-financing/images/dmpanga-quote.jpg" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>David Mpanga Post on X</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<p>It’s about whether a nation believes that the poor deserve to live as much as the rich. It’s about the difference between life and death.</p>
<p>The poor in Uganda aren’t asking for miracles. They’re asking for the basics because in many cases, they’re paying for those basics out of pocket, at the exact moment they’re least able to afford them.</p>
<p>If we wait for a perfect solution, we’ll still be waiting for another ten years. However, small, clear, and immediate action could start rewriting this story tomorrow.</p>
<p>My mother lived because of $130. That number haunts me - not because it was expensive, but because, for too many people, it’s out of reach.</p>
<p>In the 21st Century, with modern medicine and science, that should never be the reason someone dies.</p>
</section>
<section id="references" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="references">References</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://apps.who.int/nha/database/Select/Indicators/en" class="uri">https://apps.who.int/nha/database/Select/Indicators/en</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.afro.who.int/publications/who-african-region-health-expenditure-atlas-2023-0" class="uri">https://www.afro.who.int/publications/who-african-region-health-expenditure-atlas-2023-0</a></li>
<li><a href="https://x.com/dfkm1970/status/761468489206996993" class="uri">https://x.com/dfkm1970/status/761468489206996993</a></li>
</ul>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Health Financing</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/health-financing/</guid>
  <pubDate>Tue, 06 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/health-financing/images/cost-of-staying-alive.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="90" width="144"/>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Trade Under Guard</title>
  <dc:creator>Matthew Kuch</dc:creator>
  <link>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/ug-exports/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<p>On March 9, 2025, Uganda quietly deployed troops to Juba, the capital of South Sudan. No big press release. No formal announcement. Just soldiers and a military convoy crossing a border under a sky that looked the same as it always has.</p>
<p>Two days later, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Uganda’s top military officer, broke the silence on X (formerly Twitter):</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/ug-exports/images/MK_South_Sudan_Post.jpg" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>CDF Post</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<p>No further context. Just that one key word -<em>“secure”.</em></p>
<p>Which begs the question: Secure what, exactly?</p>
<p>In geopolitics, you rarely send elite troops somewhere just to <em>be</em> there and chill. You send them because something valuable might slip away. And in East Africa, few things are more valuable than a reliable trading partner.</p>
<p>South Sudan is fragile state. Always has been, since its independence. But it’s also Uganda’s <strong>second-largest export market in the East African region</strong>, an economic fact that matters alot. <img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/ug-exports/images/barchart-v2.png" class="img-fluid" alt="Exports to EAC Member States in 2024"></p>
<p>Uganda exports to South Sudan the kinds of things that a young country needs to grow: building materials, household goods, processed food, medicine. That trade isn’t just business for Uganda, it’s an economic lifeblood for thousands of Ugandan businesses and jobs.</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/ug-exports/images/eac-2charts.png" class="img-fluid figure-img"></p>
<figcaption>10 Years of EAC Trade</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<p>There’s a iron-rule that applies across countries, businesses, and families:</p>
<p><strong>You protect what you benefit from,</strong> and Uganda benefits (economically, socially and politically) from South Sudan being stable.</p>
<p>In the days and weeks leading up to the deployment, reports trickled in of political infighting in Juba, between the President Salva Kiir and his Vice President, Reich Machar, with hints that the fragile peace might not hold. If that happens, the Nimule-Juba corridor, Uganda’s commercial artery in the West-Nile region, gets severed.</p>
<p>So, the UPDF moved. Not just to keep peace. Not just to look strong. But to keep the trucks moving and the contracts alive.</p>
<section id="references" class="level2">
<h2 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="references">References</h2>
<ol type="1">
<li><a href="https://www.bou.or.ug/bouwebsite/Statistics/index.html" class="uri">https://www.bou.or.ug/bouwebsite/Statistics/index.html</a></li>
<li><a href="https://x.com/mkainerugaba/status/1899204699208724671" class="uri">https://x.com/mkainerugaba/status/1899204699208724671</a></li>
</ol>


</section>

 ]]></description>
  <category>Supply Chain Management</category>
  <guid>https://matthewkuch.com/posts/ug-exports/</guid>
  <pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
  <media:content url="https://matthewkuch.com/posts/ug-exports/images/trade-under-guard.png" medium="image" type="image/png" height="85" width="144"/>
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